I’m Richard Yee Fan Chow, PhD Candidate at the Department of Finance, Queen Mary University of London. I ever held research affiliates at the Boao Forum for Asia, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Peking University, contributing to several projects for the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Green Finance Association.

I hold an M.S. in Finance from the School of Finance, Renmin University, and was a Visiting Doctoral Student at the Business School, Imperial College London.

Research Interests

I study how political, macroeconomic, financial, and technological shocks reshape firm resources, capabilities, and strategic behavior. A complementary stream of my research examines sovereign and local government debt markets, monetary systems, and how these institutional forces influence firm decision-making and market outcomes.

Keywords: Strategic Management, Global Strategy, International Business, International Political Economy, Debt Management, and Technology Governance

Working Papers

1. Private Rails, Public Anchors: Stablecoins and the Infrastructural Reproduction of Dollar Power (invited to MPSA, PSA, BISA, Junior IO, GSIPE, and Renmin SISCDS)
   Abstract

   Why does supposedly anti-state money so often reproduce state power? This paper develops Digital Shadow Dollar Theory to explain when privately issued digital money reproduces rather than weakens incumbent financial dominance. Dollar-backed Stablecoins, when anchored to credible redemption and public regulatory authority, extend dollar claims through private token networks and generate digitally mediated dollarization. Using monthly data from July 2015 through December 2025, reduced-form screens, and a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression, the analysis shows that persistent dollar strength is associated with Stablecoin balance-sheet expansion and that Stablecoin-led liquidity shocks initially ease funding conditions but then strengthen the dollar index DXY, with transmission dominated by the combined Stablecoin balance sheet rather than Bitcoin prices.

2. Term Premia in China Sovereign Bonds
   Abstract

   This paper estimates term premia in China sovereign bonds and asks how far movements in the yield curve should be interpreted as revisions to expected future short rates rather than changes in compensation for bearing duration risk. I estimate a three-factor Gaussian affine term-structure model on monthly ChinaBond zero-coupon yields from one month to thirty years between October 2009 and March 2026. The model implies a term-premium component that is close to zero at the very short end and rises with maturity. The central empirical result is that the decomposition is not equally credible across the curve. At maturities from roughly one to six years, the expected-rate component tracks realized future short rates more closely than simple yield benchmarks, and the model-implied premium forecasts subsequent bond excess returns. At seven to ten years, the same evidence becomes weaker, less stable across subsamples, and more sensitive to observable curve slopes. The paper therefore contributes a disciplined estimate of China sovereign term premia together with explicit maturity-specific credibility margins. The main implication is that medium-maturity China yields contain separable expectations and risk-premium information, whereas the far long end is better interpreted as a benchmark pricing object than as a sharply identified measure of expected policy or duration risk.

3. Institutional Design Shapes Digital Asset Governance under Regulatory Uncertainty
   Abstract

   Institutional design shapes how states govern digital asset markets under conditions of regulatory uncertainty. This article develops a structured, focused comparison of the United States, the European Union, and Hong Kong using official legal and regulatory materials from 2019--2025 together with scholarship on the regulatory state, delegation, policy design, policy capacity, regulatory intermediaries, and digital-finance governance. The article argues that the three jurisdictions have converged on the need to govern centralized intermediaries, but they do so through distinct governance modes. Fragmented, multi-agency authority in the United States produces contested perimeter-setting and greater reliance on ex post enforcement. Legislative harmonization in the European Union produces clearer categories and ex ante authorization, but at the cost of slower formal adaptation. Hong Kong's single-regulator licensing model closes the perimeter more quickly and coherently, but concentrates governance on centralized gatekeepers rather than the broader protocol layer. The article contributes to governance scholarship by showing that cross-border differences in digital asset regulation are explained less by technology alone than by the organization of public authority, policy capacity, and the choice between supervisory and enforcement-led control.

4. No Clean Exit: Chinese Finance, Paris Club Recourse, and Layered Debt Governance
   Abstract
5. AI Supply Chain Giants, Macroeconomic Outcomes, and Governance Capacity
   Abstract